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1 The data Two types of explanations for the ambiguity of sentences such as (1) have been seen in the literature. Dowty (1979) proposes that for-phrases (as well as since-and in-phrases, which also exhibit two readings, he observes) are ambiguous, but then adds, \The tactic of appealing to a double categorisation of for-adverbials admittedly looks rather ad hoc. But let it be noted that this tactic (or an equivalent one) is needed for other adverbials as well (p. 345-6) ." An alternative claim, made by Mittwoch (1988) and Kamp & Reyle (1993) , is that the ambiguity of (1) is due to an interaction between the adverbial and the perfect tense.
The treatment I propose allows a uni ed treatment of for-phrases (and other adverbial phrases) and is based in part upon the observation that the ambiguity found in sentences such as (1) is also found in simple tense sentences, thus ruling out the perfect tense as the cause of this ambiguity. After introducing a test that shows that simple tense sentences have this ambiguity as well and that in each case one reading is lost when the adverbial appears in initial position, I'll argue that Diesing's (1992) treatment of semantic partition can explain both the observed ambiguity and certain apparent counterexamples.
With the purpose of characterising the readings more precisely, consider an example in the past perfect tense:
(2) Mary had lived in Boston for four years.
According to Reichenbach (1947) , in the past perfect the event time E during which Mary lived in Boston is interpreted as temporally prior to the reference time R, which, in turn, is prior to speech time S, represented as E R S. Sentence (2) has a reading in which Mary lived in Boston for the four years ending at R and a reading in which there was some four-year interval preceding R during which Mary lived in Boston. Adopting Klein's (1992) terminology, I will refer to the former reading, in which the four-year interval is interpreted as having a xed position on the time axis, as position-de nite (p-de nite), and I will refer to the latter reading as non-p-de nite. Given that Reichenbach assigns the time point ordering E S,R to the present perfect (where \S,R" indicates that S and R coincide temporally), it is possible to make the generalisation over both present perfect examples such as (1) and past perfect examples that the p-de nite reading is one in which the event time E ends at R and the non-p-de nite reading is one in which E is some time prior to R. Now consider the simple future tense, to which Reichenbach assigns the ordering S,R E. 1 My claim is that sentence (3) has both a non-p-de nite reading in which Martha will be in her o ce for some unspeci ed hour in the future and a p-de nite reading in which Martha will be in her o ce for the hour beginning at R (where R coincides with speech time): 2 (3) Martha will be in her o ce for an hour.
These readings are illustrated in (4):
When the adverbial is in initial position as in (5) the non-p-de nite reading is unavailable:
(5) For an hour Martha will be in her o ce.
The only available reading here is one in which Martha will be in her o ce for the hour beginning at R. The contrast is more clearly seen when the presence of another adverbial forces the nonp-de nite reading, as below:
(6) a. Martha will be in her o ce for an hour one day next week.
b. Martha will be in her o ce one day next week for an hour.
c. #For an hour Martha will be in her o ce one day next week.
d. #One day next week for an hour Martha will be in her o ce.
The phrase one day next week moves the one-hour interval into the future so that the p-de nite reading is ruled out. The awkwardness of the sentence when the for-phrase is in initial position, as in (6c) and (d), shows that the non-p-de nite reading is incompatible with the for-phrase in this position.
This ambiguity arises with other adverbials, as well. Consider the following:
(7) a. Martha will be in her o ce at noon.
b. The rain will begin on Saturday.
c. John will live in Brooklyn in the summer.
There is a non-p-de nite reading of (7a) in which Martha is in her o ce at some noon in the future, and a p-de nite reading in which she is in her o ce at the noon most closely following R (= S). (If the sentence is spoken in the morning, for example, the p-de nite reading is one in which noon refers to the noon of the current day.) Similarly for (7b) and (c), there is a nonp-de nite reading in which the NP refers to some future Saturday or summer, and a p-de nite reading in which it refers to the Saturday/summer most closely following R. There is also an unusual p-de nite reading for in in examples such as (8): (8) Smith & Co. will build a bridge in ten weeks.
This sentence has a non-p-de nite reading according to which it takes ten weeks for the bridge to be built, and a p-de nite reading according to which Smith & Co. begin to build the bridge ten weeks after R. In each of these examples the non-p-de nite reading is lost when the adverbial is in initial position, as shown by the unacceptability of the phrase one day in the following examples:
(9) a. At noon Martha will be in her o ce (#one day).
b. On Saturday the rain will begin (#one day).
c. In the summer John will live in Brooklyn (#one day).
d. In ten weeks Smith & Co. will build a bridge (#one day).
It is important when constructing these examples that the NP object of the adverbial be interpretable both as a time whose position is xed on the time axis and a time whose position is not xed, such as \two hours," \Tuesday," or \the summer"; NPs such as 1989 and next
Tuesday and examples containing scalar predicates such as only and almost behave di erently.
Examples which appear to be exceptions to the generalisation that the non-p-de nite reading is lost when the adverbial is in initial position, such as the generic (10), will be discussed later.
(10) In one hour Americans consume ve million gallons of fuel.
Even simple past tense examples, which appear at rst glance to be straightforwardly un- (13) a. Greg took the job at Kodak. In the winter he xed copy machines.
b. Greg took the job at Kodak. He xed copy machines in the winter once (which is why they o ered him the job). The only interpretation of (13a) is that rst Greg was hired and during the following winter he xed copy machines{ a simple progression of the narrative. In (13b), however, the phrase the winter can refer to any winter in the past, in keeping with the generalisation we've made concerning the non-p-de nite reading| that the time E is not xed on the time axis. Because a narrative progresses as the reference time R is updated (Hinrichs 1981 , Partee 1984 , the p-de nite reading of (13a) is one in which E must coincide with that updated R, while in the non-p-de nite reading the reference time is determined by factors such as world knowledge rather than by the processes controlling narrative progression.
In sum, I have argued that a sentence of any tense containing a temporal adverbial such as for two hours or until noon has both a p-de nite and a non-p-de nite reading, and that only the p-de nite reading is available when the adverbial is in sentence-initial position. Furthermore, the p-de nite reading is one in which the event time E has a particular temporal relationship to R on the time axis as determined by tense and the preposition heading the adverbial.
As an aside, I should mention that a present perfect sentence such as (14) often has only a non-p-de nite reading with an adverbial: (14) a. John has been in the bath until midnight.
b. #Until midnight John has been in the bath. Sentence (14a) is possible as a response to a query concerning whether it's true that John tends to hog the bathroom, but there is no p-de nite reading, as (14b) shows. I won't go into detail here other than to note that I explain the lack of a p-de nite reading in (Hitzeman 1994 ) in terms of a problem with time deixis: the p-de nite reading of an until-sentence is one in which E ends at R, which is cotemporal with speech time in the present perfect tense. Therefore, in the p-de nite reading that should be available in (14b), midnight would refer to speech time.
Because one must use the indexical now to refer to speech time, the p-de nite reading is ruled out because it is pragmatically odd.
A semantic partition solution
The solution I am going to propose is that the ambiguity we've been discussing is due to the way the process of mapping syntax onto semantics works rather than to an ambiguity of the adverbial. I will show how the ambiguity can be explained in terms of semantic partition, by incorporating the observations concerning temporal adverbials into Diesing's (1992) treatment of the di erent readings of inde nites as a semantic partition phenomenon. 
The Mapping Hypothesis
Generic sentences such as Dogs bark are commonly represented semantically in terms of a tripartite structure consisting of an operator, a restrictor and a nuclear scope, e.g., GEN dog(x)] bark(x)]. According to Diesing (1992) , this interpretation is obtained by means of a \tree-splitting" operation which divides the syntactic tree into two parts (and a quantier), and the two parts of the tree are interpreted in di erent semantic correlates. She extends this notion of semantic partition to the interpretation of inde nites, so that, e.g., if the NP a cow is in one portion of the tree it is interpreted as referring to a speci c cow, and if it is in the other portion the cow referred to is nonspeci c. Based on our observation that a sentence with a temporal adverbial has two interpretations and that the position of the adverbial a ects the interpretation, I will argue that the ambiguity observed in a sentence with a temporal adverbial is also a result of semantic partition. In addition to providing an explanation for the ambiguity observed here, Diesing's formulation of semantic partition explains certain apparent counterexamples which would be otherwise di cult to explain.
Diesing proposes that there is a mapping procedure that divides the syntactic tree (at the level of LF in languages such as English and at the level of S-structure in languages such as Dutch) into two parts which correspond to two di erent parts of the semantic representation, and illustrates the syntactic division as follows (p. 9): In the transition from syntax to semantics, items in the IP (=S) area are treated di erently from those in the VP area: when an operator such as the generic operator is present, items in the IP area are mapped into the restrictor clause of that operator and are bound by it, and items in the VP area are mapped into the nuclear scope and are bound by existential closure.
This split is also responsible for cases in which, there being no operator present, items in the IP area are interpreted as speci c and items in the VP area are interpreted as nonspeci c. One of the motivations for this operation is the following set of Dutch examples from Reuland (1988) :
(16) a. Fred denkt dat IP twee koeien op het dak liggen].
Fred thinks that two cows on the roof lie. According to Reuland, when the phrase twee koeien is in subject position as in (16a), the interpretation is that these are two speci c cows. In (16b), where er is in subject position and twee koeien is within the VP, the two cows can be interpreted as any two cows. Given Diesing's assumption that the tree-splitting operation occurs at S-structure in Dutch, these data provide evidence that VP-internal material is interpreted as nonspeci c, while VP-external material is interpreted as speci c.
Extending the Mapping Hypothesis to temporal adverbials
In order to extend Diesing's approach to temporal adverbials, we need to relate the speci c/nonspeci c interpretation of inde nites to that of p-de nite/non-p-de nite NPs, and to
show that at LF (where the Mapping Hypothesis applies in English) temporal adverbials can attach either in the IP area or in the VP area, and that each of these placements of the adverbial corresponds to a di erent reading.
The similarity between the speci c/nonspeci c interpretations of NPs and the p-de nite/nonp-de nite readings of temporal adverbials can be seen if we examine more closely how the Mapping Hypothesis produces the speci c/nonspeci c readings. Reuland's Dutch sentences provide an example of the di erence between a speci c reading (in (16a)) and the nonspeci c reading (in (16b)). The interpretation of (16b) is obtained through existential closure; twee koeien can refer to any two cows. In contrast, in (16a) there is some knowledge about which cows are being spoken of; the referent of twee koeien is taken from the context of the utterance.
Diesing argues that the speci c/nonspeci c readings can be equated with the presuppositional/nonpresuppositional readings described by Milsark (1974) . Milsark distinguishes between two types of determiners: weak determiners such as a, some and three, which can appear with a subject in there-insertion contexts, and strong determiners such as the, all and most, which cannot appear in these contexts:
(17) a. There is/are a/some/a few/many/three y ( ies) in my soup.
b. *There is/are the/every/all/most y ( ies) in my soup.
Another distinction between these two types of determiners, Milsark notes, is that strong determiners presuppose the existence of the entities they are applied to, while weak determiners are ambiguous, having both a presuppositional and a nonpresuppositional reading. For example, the weak determiner some has one reading in (18a) in which the existence of the ghosts is asserted but not presupposed, and another reading in (18b), where stressed some presupposes the existence of ghosts:
(18) a. There are some ghosts in my house.
b. SOME ghosts are in the pantry; the others are in the attic.
Strong determiners such as every and most only allow a presuppositional reading, as in the following examples, where the existence of ghosts is presupposed:
(19) a. Every ghost roasted marshmallows.
b. Most ghosts sleep late.
Like the speci c reading, the presuppositional reading is one in which the referent of the NP is taken from the context (through accommodation, if necessary). In (18b), for example, there is a set of ghosts in the context and the NP SOME ghosts takes its referent from that set.
The p-de nite reading can be related to the speci c reading in a similar fashion; in the p-de nite reading, the time the event occurs is determined relative to the contextually-determined time R. We can generalise over Diesing's speci c/nonspeci c readings, Milsark's presuppositional/non-presuppositional readings and the p-de nite/non-p-de nite readings discussed here by saying that the former interpretations involve the context while the latter ones involve existential closure.
Diesing proposes to account for the di erence in the speci city (or presuppositionality, equivalently) of strong and weak determiners in English by claiming that they are treated di erently at LF. In Government and Binding Theory (Chomsky, 1981) , the scope of a quanti er is determined at LF through the movement rule of Quanti er Raising (QR) (May 1977 (May , 1985 . While position in order to satisfy requirements such as Case and agreement (Kitagawa, 1986) . Because it has a trace within the VP it can lower at LF back to that position in a manner analogous to that of raising predicates (see May (1977 May ( , 1985 ). Unlike the subject, there is no reason to think that a sentence-level adverbial has raised at S-structure; it has no motivation for movement such as Case or agreement. We can therefore assume, in keeping with the principles put forward in (Chomsky, 1991) , that the adverbial has not moved. Because it has not raised, it has no VP-internal trace position to return to. Therefore a weak NP object of an adverbial that is at sentence-level at S-structure does not lower but instead must raise to adjoin to IP at LF and is interpreted by the Mapping Hypothesis as p-de nite/strong. This analysis correctly predicts that a sentence with an adverbial in position A at S-structure is unambiguously p-de nite. The same argument applies to an adverbial in position B.
With an adverbial in sentence-nal position containing a weak NP, the sentences are ambiguous, as we have seen. When the adverbial is in nal position at S-structure it is either in position B or position C. According to Diesing's hypothesis, a weak NP in position C may raise at LF or remain in place, so such an adverbial will cause the sentence to be ambiguous.
In summary, when an adverbial is in initial position at S-structure it is in position A, then raises to adjoin to IP at LF, where the Mapping Hypothesis interprets it as p-de nite. When the adverbial is in nal position at S-structure, it is either in position B where it must adjoin to IP at LF or in position C where it may or may not raise at LF. If it raises, the Mapping Hypothesis causes it to be interpreted as p-de nite, and if not, as non-p-de nite, thus correctly predicting the ambiguity observed in a sentence with an adverbial in sentence-nal position at S-structure and the lack of ambiguity when it is in initial position.
Further motivation for the conclusion that it is the LF position of a temporal adverbial that determines its interpretation is that it allows us to explain the ambiguity in examples such as (21): (21) Susan has lived in Boston for three years and has worked at Kodak for six years.
The adverbials can either both take on p-de nite readings or both non-p-de nite readings, and yet, because the VPs are conjoined, the adverbials must both be attached at VP-level; to analyse (21) as a case of conjoined sentences would give a ridiculously complex syntactic structure. Yet if it is the level of LF at which an adverbial gets its p-de nite or non-p-de nite interpretation, the ambiguity of (21) is easily explained in the same way that we explained the ambiguity of a sentence with an adverbial in position C at S-structure (along with a rule for across-the-board extraction from a conjoined phrase).
Problems with de nite descriptions
One problem in extending Diesing's treatment to temporal adverbials is that both Diesing and Milsark group the de nite determiner in the set of strong determiners, but in the temporal adverbial data it acts like a weak determiner in the sense that a temporal adverbial with an object such as the summer is ambiguous. More speci cally, if we extend Diesing's treatment to adverbials, we correctly predict that any adverbial with a weak NP object will cause a sentence to have both a p-de nite and a non-p-de nite reading:
(22) Martha will be in her o ce for an/a few/many/three hour(s).
We also predict that any adverbial with an object that has a strong determiner will give the sentence a p-de nite reading because, whether the adverbial is attached at VP-level or not, the NP will raise at LF to be interpreted as part of the restrictor clause. This analysis makes correct predictions for all strong determiners except the:
(23) a. John lived in Boston during every/all/most leap year(s) (for the past 30 years).
b. John lived in Boston during the summer.
The determiner the in sentence (23b) acts like a weak determiner, allowing both a p-de nite and a non-p-de nite reading, as discussed for example (7c). (24) a. John got these data from the student of a linguist.
b. I usually had breakfast at the corner of a major intersection.
Something about the \the X of a Y" construction allows both a strong and a weak interpretation.
If we consider expressions such as the summer to have a semantics similar to the summer of a year, either lexically or because they're elliptical, then we can say that whatever explanation accounts for examples such as (24) will also account for (23b). Of course we still need an explanation such as the one Poesio proposes for why \the X of a Y" constructions act like weak
NPs, but this is outside the scope of this paper.
Explaining an apparent exception
Earlier I mentioned that generic sentences (Carlson, 1980) and sentences containing modals appear to be exceptions to the generalisation that when the adverbial is in initial position the sentence has only a p-de nite interpretation. Consider the following: 4 (25) a. In one hour Americans consume 10 million gallons of fuel.
b. On New Year's Eve people crowd into Times Square.
(26) a. In six minutes Martha could gap all twelve plugs.
b. In three minutes John can do fty push-ups, nine chin-ups and a cartwheel.
The sentences in (25) contain an implicit generic operator, and those in (26) contain the explicit modals could and can, respectively. We've observed that when the adverbial is in initial position the sentence has a p-de nite reading, but this is not true for these generic and modal examples.
In (25a), for example, the phrase one hour refers to a nonspeci c hour and in (25b) New Year's Eve refers to New Year's Eves in general rather than to a particular New Year's Eve. Compare the adverbials in (25) and (26) to this afternoon, which can only refer to a particular afternoon and therefore forces a p-de nite reading. These necessarily p-de nite phrases cannot appear with generics:
(27) #This afternoon Americans consume ve million gallons of fuel.
Having extended Diesing's treatment to temporal adverbials, we can use it to explain why these examples don't allow a p-de nite reading. According to her hypothesis the presence of a generic or modal operator does not result in the speci c/nonspeci c interpretation; instead, when such an operator is present, items higher in the tree are interpreted as part of the restrictor clause and items lower in the tree as part of the nuclear scope of that operator. Thus the NP one hour in (25a) is interpreted generically because it is in the restrictor clause of the generic operator. The interpretations of sentences such as (25) and (26) are not exceptions, therefore, but follow directly from Diesing's treatment.
Summary of the proposal
My central point is that it is not necessary to treat temporal adverbials as lexically ambiguous in order to explain the ambiguity of sentences such as (28):
(28) Mary has lived in Amsterdam for three years.
My solution is an extension of Diesing's (1992) Mapping Hypothesis, which speci es that in the interface between syntax and semantics the phrase structure tree is split in two, and the two parts of the tree are mapped onto di erent semantic correlates. She argues that a subject in English has a speci c interpretation if it is in the higher portion of the tree at LF and a nonspeci c interpretation if it is within the VP. I argue that the NP object of an adverbial is also a ected by this tree-splitting operation, so that if the NP three years in (28) is in the higher portion of the tree at LF the reading will be that Mary has lived in Amsterdam for the three years preceding reference time R and if it is attached at VP-level the reading will be that there was some three-year interval in the past during which Mary lived in Amsterdam. The loss of one reading when the adverbial is in initial position is caused by the lack of a VP-internal trace position for it to lower to at LF, thus forcing it to be interpreted as part of the higher portion of the tree. Lucia Tovena for helpful comments and discussions. 1 Reichenbach actually suggests that the translation for the simple future tense is ambiguous between S,R E and S R,E, but he adds the latter translation to deal with sentences containing the temporal adverbs now and tomorrow. I agree that temporal adverbials a ect the relative temporal positions of S, R and E (and I in fact argue in Hitzeman (1993) that other con gurations are possible), but without adverbs Reichenbach's basic set of translations used here are su cient. In addition, the fact that the readings associated with the type of temporal adverbial I discuss here interact with these translations (as we shall see) is evidence that these are the appropriate translations for sentences without adverbs, and that it is the adverb that a ects the translation rather than the translation itself that is ambiguous.
2 The existence of two readings was pointed out to me by Marc Moens. 3 The exact position of the subject at D-structure varies in di erent proposals, an issue which Diesing sets aside. See her footnote 5, Chapter 2, page 138 for discussion.
4 Example (25a) is due to Derek Gross.
